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1. INTRODUCTION	  	  In	  this	  informal	  paper	  I	  bring	  together	  several	  lines	  of	  argument	  that	  appear	  to	  converge	  on	  a	  possible	   diagnosis	   for	   the	   disastrous	   effects	   of	   today’s	   political	   economy	   landscape	   on	  many	  people’s	   lives,	   on	   many	   communities,	   and	   on	   the	   environment.	   Although	   I	   did	   choose	   a	  particular	  analytical	  lens	  –	  social	  constructivism	  –	  to	  develop	  my	  argument,	  I	  tried	  to	  follow	  to	  the	  best	  of	  my	  ability	  a	  structural	  analysis	  rather	  than	  ideological	  choices	  or	  positions.	  A	  basic	  level	   of	   ethical	   choice	   is	   implicitly	   or	   explicitly	   invoked,	   for	   example	   to	   say	   that	   extreme	  imbalances	   in	  market	   power,	   even	   if	   they	  may	  be	  perfectly	   legal,	   appear	   to	   have	  deleterious	  effects	  on	  smaller	  economic	  players	  and	  on	  the	  environment;	  and	  that,	  for	  this	  reason,	  there	  is	  something	   ‘wrong’	  with	   them.	  When	  such	  value	   judgements	  are	  made,	  however,	   I	   emphasize	  their	  structural	  causes	  more	  than	  their	  moral	  or	  ethical	  motivations,	  even	  though	  it	  would	  not	  be	  entirely	  truthful	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  latter	  do	  no	  play	  a	  part.	  	  As	   a	   radically	   interdisciplinary	   researcher	  with	   initial	   training	   in	   aerospace	   engineering	   and	  experience	  in	  physics	  pedagogy,	  board-­‐level	  electronic	  design,	  interdisciplinary	  media	  research,	  social	  science,	   theoretical	  computer	  science,	  and	  applied	  mathematics,	   I	  bring	  to	  this	  exercise	  25	  years	  of	   experience	   in	  building	  bridges	  across	  disciplines	   rather	   than	  a	   formal	   training	   in	  social	  science	  and,	  more	  to	  the	  point,	  in	  social	  theory,	  economic	  theory,	  and	  political	  theory.	  My	  argument	   is	   therefore	   necessarily	   sketchy	   and	   my	   bibliography	   incomplete.	   This	   short	  document	  should	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  working	  paper	  rather	   than	  a	  complete	  academic	  study.	   In	  particular,	  it	  still	  lacks	  an	  empirical	  study	  of	  the	  main	  example	  that	  I	  discuss	  in	  the	  later	  parts	  of	  the	  paper,	  the	  www.sardex.net	  credit	  system.	  One	  such	  study	  is	  planned	  for	  later	  this	  year.	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The	  main	   purpose	   of	   this	   paper,	   in	   its	   present	   form	   or	   later	   in	   a	  more	   complete	   form,	   is	   to	  stimulate	   debate	   and	   productive	   collaborations	   with	   other	   researchers	   from	   disciplines	  relevant	  to	  this	  discussion,	  which	  is	  conducted	  entirely	  within	  the	  bounds	  of	  social	  science.	  For	  these	  reasons	  the	  title	  promises	  more	  than	  this	  version	  of	  the	  paper	  currently	  delivers.	  	  For	  added	  context,	  especially	   for	  non-­‐social	  scientists,	   it	  helps	  to	  explain	  how	  I	  arrived	  at	   the	  ideas	  presented	  here	  by	  following	  a	  roughly	  historical	  or	  chronological	  narrative	  that	  tracks	  the	  most	   important	  moments	   in	  my	   ‘discovery’	   of	   social	   science.	   Some	   of	   the	   points	   and	   figures	  discussed	  here	  have	  already	  been	  presented	   in	  Dini	  et	  al.	   (2011),	  Breitstein	  and	  Dini	   (2011),	  Dini	  (2012),	  and	  Dini	  and	  Sartori	  (2013).	  Section	  2	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  ‘tutorial’	  that	  provides	  a	  sketch	  of	   the	   theoretical	   landscape	  of	   social	   science,	  which	   is	  needed	   to	   elaborate	   the	  points	  made	  later	  in	  the	  paper	  and	  is	  meant	  to	  make	  the	  paper	  relatively	  self-­‐contained.	  The	  section	  starts	   by	   defining	   basic	   terms	   and	   concepts,	   laying	   out	   a	   first	   meta-­‐theoretical	   framework	  organized	  around	  the	  two	  dichotomies	  objectivism/subjectivism	  and	   individualism/holism	   that	  is	   meant	   to	   help	   in	   the	   ‘decoding’	   of	   social	   science	   writings	   and	   ideas.	   The	   next	   subsection	  introduces	  conflict	  as	  a	  third	  fundamental	  dimension	  of	  social	  science	  and	  elaborates	  briefly	  on	  the	   implications	   for	  political	   theory	  and	  political	  engagement.	   I	   then	  add	  a	   fourth	  dimension,	  
value,	   and	   invoke	   economic	   anthropology	   as	   a	   rich	   and	   fruitful	   theory	   through	   which	  phenomena	  like	  open	  source	  and	  the	  Commons	  can	  be	  understood.	  The	  final	  part	  of	  this	  section	  addresses	  issues	  of	  scale	  through	  processes	  of	  institutionalization.	  	  Building	  on	  this	  basic	  set	  of	  analytical	  tools,	  Section	  3	  gives	  a	  very	  brief	  summary	  of	  the	  main	  points	   of	   David	   Graeber’s	   book	   on	   an	   anthropological	   history	   of	   debt	   (2011),	   which	   plays	   a	  central	   role	   in	   this	  paper.	  This	  section	  ends	  with	  a	  definition	  of	   the	   ‘unholy	  spiral’,	   a	   concept	  that	  draws	  on	  all	   the	  references	  cited	   in	   this	  paper.	  After	  acknowledging	  the	  heroic	  efforts	  of	  traditional	  cultures	   that	  are	  particularly	  close	   to	   the	  environment,	  such	  as	   the	  Canadian	  First	  Nation	   tribes,	   in	   surviving	   the	   consequences	   of	   the	   current	   composition	   of	   the	   capitalist	  economy,	   Section	   4	   outlines	   a	   possible	   strategy	   for	   local	   action,	   that	   I	   call	   the	   social	  construction	   of	   economic	   identity,	   through	   a	   particular	   kind	   of	   alternative	   currency.	   This	  approach	  at	  local	  action	  appears	  to	  enable	  a	  moderate	  level	  of	  insulation	  from	  and	  constructive	  engagement	  with	  the	  political	  economy	  forces	  at	  play,	  contributes	  to	  positive	  GDP	  accounting	  and	  tax	  revenue,	  remains	  embedded	  in	  and	  reinforces	  social	  structure,	  and	  carries	  the	  potential	  for	  wider	  cultural	  transformation.	  Section	  5	  draws	  some	  conclusions.	  	  	  	  
2. THE	  DIMENSIONS	  OF	  SOCIAL	  SCIENCE	  	   Ontology	  and	  Epistemology	  	  An	  engineer	  or	  ‘hard’	  scientist	  starting	  to	  work	  in	  social	  science	  will	  sooner	  or	  later	  encounter	  a	  ‘fundamental’	  problem:	  paraphrasing	  Anthony	  Giddens,	  the	  difficult	  aspect	  of	  social	  science	  is	  that,	  unlike	  what	  happens	   in	  physics,	   the	  object	  of	   research	  has	  opinions	  about	  what	   is	  being	  said	   about	   them.	   How	   many	   opinions?	   As	   many	   as	   there	   are	   individuals.	   The	   apparently	  insurmountable	  challenge	  of	  accounting	   for	  as	  many	  opinions	  as	   there	  are	   individuals	  can	  be	  approached	  constructively	  (no	  pun	  intended!)	  through	  a	  relatively	  newer	  area	  of	  social	  science	  that	  is	  inspired	  by	  hermeneutic	  (‘interpretative’)	  philosophy.	  A	  popular	  theoretical	  perspective	  that	  belongs	  to	  this	  current	  is	  social	  constructivism	  (Berger	  and	  Luckmann,	  1966):	  	   To	  say	  of	  something	  that	   it	   is	  socially	  constructed	   is	   to	  emphasize	   its	  dependence	  on	  contingent	  aspects	  of	  our	  social	  selves.	  It	  is	  to	  say:	  This	  thing	  could	  not	  have	  existed	  had	  we	  not	  built	  it;	  and	  we	  need	  not	  have	  built	   it	  at	  all,	  at	   least	  not	   in	   its	  present	   form.	  Had	  we	  been	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  society,	  had	  we	  had	  different	  needs,	  values,	  or	  interests,	  we	  might	  well	  have	  built	  a	  different	  kind	  of	   thing,	   or	   built	   this	   one	   differently.	   The	   inevitable	   contrast	   is	  with	   a	   naturally	   existing	   object,	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something	  that	  exists	  independently	  of	  us	  and	  which	  we	  did	  not	  have	  a	  hand	  in	  shaping.	  There	  are	  certainly	  many	  things,	  and	  facts	  about	  them,	  that	  are	  socially	  constructed	  in	  the	  sense	  specified	  by	  this	  core	  idea:	  money,	  citizenship	  and	  newspapers,	  for	  example.	  None	  of	  these	  things	  could	  have	  existed	   without	   society;	   and	   each	   of	   them	   could	   have	   been	   constructed	   differently	   had	   we	   so	  chosen.	  (Boghossian,	  2001)	  	  Thus,	   subjective	   hermeneutics	   and	   social	   constructivist	   processes	   can	   be	   juxtaposed	   to	   the	  objectivism	   of	   physics	   to	   create	   consensual	   agreements	   that	   acquire	   the	   status	   of	   ‘reality’	   in	  social	   life	   as	   much	   as	   trees	   and	   rocks	   are	   ‘real’	   in	   physical	   life.	   A	   set	   of	   beliefs	   about	   the	  constitution	  of	  reality	  defines	  an	  ontology.	  Thus,	  where	  physics	  relies	  on	  an	  objectivist	  ontology	  and	  phenomenology	  assumes	  a	  subjectivist	  ontology,	  social	  constructivism	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  half-­‐way	  point	  between	  these	  extremes,	  or	  an	  inter-­‐subjective	  ontology,	  to	  use	  Karl	  Popper’s	  term.	  An	  inter-­‐subjective	  or	  socially	  constructed	  ontology,	  therefore,	  can	  be	  said	  to	  emerge	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  social	  process	  mediated	  by	  language.	  	  Similar	   distinctions	   apply	   to	   the	   construction	   of	   knowledge,	   or	   epistemology.	   In	   the	   hard	  sciences,	  knowledge	  is	  constructed	  through	  quantitative	  theories	  and	  observations,	  whereas	  in	  the	   hermeneutics	   tradition	   knowledge,	   like	   reality,	   is	   constructed	   through	   social	   processes	  mediated	  by	  language.	  Of	  course,	  much	  of	  the	  knowledge	  in	  the	  hard	  sciences	  is	  also	  created	  in	  this	  manner,	  as	  explained	  by	  Thomas	  Kuhn	  (1996),	  but	  not	  all	  such	  scientists	  are	  fully	  aware	  of	  this	  as	  they	  tend	  to	  lack	  in	  reflexivity.	  	  Following	  Hollis	   (1994),	   Figure	  1	   shows	   these	  different	  perspectives	   in	   social	   science	  as	   two	  columns	   in	   a	   two-­‐dimensional	   diagram.	   The	   blue	   boxes	   indicate	   some	   of	   the	   social	   science	  epistemologies	   that	  we	   are	   discussing.	   A	   few	   indicative	   names	   are	   shown	   to	  make	   the	   table	  easier	   to	   interpret.	   The	   left-­‐hand	   column	   is	   generally	   associated	   with	   the	   rationalist,	  deterministic	   tradition.	   In	   Western	   thought	   it	   is	   the	   older	   of	   the	   two,	   and	   grew	   out	   of	  naturalistic	  philosophy.	  The	  right-­‐hand	  column	  is	  more	  recent,	  reflecting	  a	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  the	   social	   world	   in	   defining	   reality	   (ontology)	   and	   the	   construction	   of	   knowledge	  (epistemology).	   Although	   interpreting	   the	   two	   columns	   as	   an	   objective-­‐subjective	   dichotomy	  risks	  gross	  oversimplification,	  those	  in	  the	  left-­‐hand	  column	  can	  be	  grouped	  loosely	  as	  sharing	  a	  belief	  in	  some	  form	  of	   ‘objective’	  reality,	  whereas	  a	  more	  ‘subjective’	  perspective	  permeates	  the	  ideas	  of	  those	  named	  in	  the	  right	  column.	  The	  column	  on	  the	  left	  is	  generally	  acknowledged	  to	  have	  a	  much	  greater	  constituency	  (and	  to	  attract	  more	   funding)	  within	  social	  science	  than	  the	   traditions	   on	   the	   right	   that	   are	   inspired	   in	   part	   by	   a	   hermeneutic	   (i.e.	   interpretative)	  philosophy.	  	  	  The	  table	  can	  also	  be	  understood	   in	   terms	  of	  different	  accounts	  of	  social	  systems	  and	  human	  action.	   The	   top	   row	   favours	   a	   view	   of	   society	   and	   the	   economy	   that	   is	   biased	   toward	   the	  importance	  of	  structures	  and	  systems	  over	  individuals,	  whereas	  the	  bottom	  row	  represents	  the	  opposite	  emphasis.	  This	  distinction	  is	  reflected	  in	  methodology	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  theories	  in	  the	  top	   row	   tend	   to	   be	   deductive,	   deriving	   behaviour	   from	   general	   principles	   and	   structures,	  whereas	  the	  bottom	  row	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  tradition	  of	  empiricism	  and	  positivism,	  where	  general	  principles	  are	  derived	  from	  experience	  through	  an	  inductive	  and	  emergent	  process.	  	  An	   example	   of	   the	   deep	   epistemological	   gap	   between	   the	   two	   columns	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   the	  incommensurabily	   between	   the	   construction	   of	   mathematical	   knowledge	   through	   theorem	  proving	   and	   the	   insights	   gained	   through	   qualitative	   methods	   in	   sociology	   such	   as	   in-­‐depth	  interviews	  and	  ethnography.	  As	  discussed	  in	  Dini	  and	  Sartori	  (2013)	  and	  in	  Dini	  et	  al.	  (2011),	  in	  some	  cases	  this	  epistemological	  gap,	  which	  is	  not	  an	  immediate	  concern	  for	  us	  here,	  can	  be	  bridged	   by	   developing	   a	   common	  methodology	   or	   by	   collaborating	   towards	   a	   practical	   joint	  endeavour.	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Figure	  1:	  Hollis’s	  map	  of	  social	  science	  (1994)	  	  	   Conflict	  and	  Radical	  Democracy	  	  Another	  very	  useful	  reference	  that	  provides	  some	  bearings	  for	  how	  to	  orient	  oneself	   in	  social	  science	  is	  Burrell	  and	  Morgan	  (1979).	  They	  provide	  a	  similar	  map	  to	  Hollis’s	  which	  is,	  however,	  organized	  somewhat	  differently	  around	  the	  binaries	  objectivism/subjectivism	  and	  regulation/	  
conflict.	   Because	   one	   axis	   is	   the	   same,	   there	   are	   3	   independent	   dimensions	   and	   the	  epistemological	   space	   thus	  defined	   can	  be	  drawn	   in	  3-­‐D	   space,	   as	   shown	   in	  Figures	  2	   and	  3.	  These	  diagrams	  were	  originally	  meant	  as	  a	  tongue-­‐in-­‐cheek	  ‘engineering	  view	  of	  social	  science’,	  but	  can	  serve	  as	  useful	  mnemonics	  all	  the	  same.	  	  As	  shown	  in	  these	  figures,	  some	  social	  science	  theories	  assume	  that	  harmonious	  coexistence	  is	  possible.	   These	   tend	   to	   draw	   on	   biology	   to	   imagine	   social	   systems	   as	   (potentially)	   healthy	  organisms	  and	  were	  popular	   in	   the	   latter	  part	   of	   the	  19th	  Century	   (e.g.	   Emile	  Durkheim)	  but	  also	   as	   recently	   as	   the	   1950s	   (e.g.	   Talcott	   Parsons).	   According	   to	   Burrell	   and	   Morgan	   such	  theories	   belong	   to	   a	   ‘sociology	   of	   regulation’.1	  By	   contrast,	   other	   theorists,	   such	   as	  Marx,	   see	  conflict	   as	   a	   permanent	   property	   of	   social	   systems;	   these	   theories	   belong	   to	   a	   ‘sociology	   of	  radical	  change’.	  	  The	   political	   theory	   of	   Chantal	   Mouffe	   (1992,	   2000)	   is	   particularly	   helpful	   in	   this	   context,	  because	   she	   advocates	   a	   concept	   that	   could	   be	   said	   to	   fall	   in	   the	   middle	   between	   these	  extremes	  and	   that	   she	   calls	  agonistic	  pluralism.	  With	   agonistic	  pluralism	  Mouffe	   gives	  up	   the	  possibility	   of	   reaching	   a	   Habermasian	   consensus	   through	   dialogue	   and	   accepts	   that	  irreconcilable	   idelogical	   differences	   may	   persist.	   However,	   she	   rejects	   sterile	   political	  polarization	  and	  advocates	  a	  political	  environment	  based	  on	  mutual	  respect	  and	  constructive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  As	   a	   reflexive	   note,	   my	   own	   training	   in	   engineering	   propels	   me	   towards	   the	   sociology	   of	   regulation	   and	  harmonious	   organicistic	   and	   systemic	   models.	   However,	   I	   rely	   on	   such	   conceptualizations	   more	   as	   rough	   and	  intuitive	  mental	  models	  than	  an	  actual	  epistemology.	  For	  example,	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  potential	  dynamic	  equilibrium	  that	  is	  discussed	  in	  the	  later	  sections	  of	  this	  paper	  should	  be	  seen	  merely	  as	  a	  device	  for	  facilitating	  the	  explanation	  of	   a	   difficult	   and	  uncertain	  process	   of	   discovery	   and	  negotiation	   that	   depends	  heavily	   on	   the	   local	   context	   and	   is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  perceived	  as	  harmonious	  at	  any	  time	  by	  the	  people	  directly	  involved.	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engagement	  –	  and	  may	  the	  best	  win!	  The	  tradition	  of	  political	  theory	  that	  I	  am	  identifying	  with	  Mouffe	   is	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘radical	   democracy’	   and	   is	   based	   on	   a	   commitment	   to	   political	  participation	  also	  in	  economic	  life.	  As	  I	  argue	  below	  this	  is	  more	  easily	  accomplished	  at	  the	  local	  level	  than	  within	  the	  current	  context	  of	  the	  nation	  state.	  	  
	  
Figure	  3:	  Three	  dimensions	  of	  social	  science	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Domains	  of	  Value	  	  The	  final	  fundamental	  dimension	  of	  social	  science,	  based	  on	  my	  experience	  so	  far,	  is	  value.	  The	  motivations	  for	  extending	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘economy’	  beyond	  the	  market	  are	  various,	  ranging	  from	  political	  ideology	  to	  business	  innovation,	  but	  what	  could	  arguably	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  most	   important	  motivation	   remains	   rather	   subtle	   and	   difficult	   to	   understand	   because	   it	  challenges	  the	  preconception	  ‘Economy	  =	  Market’	  that	  has	  by	  now	  become	  deeply	  ingrained	  in	  our	  collective	  consciousness.	  	  An	  extension	  of	  systemic	  economic	  relationships	  beyond	  the	  market	  has	  been	  developed	  within	  the	   field	  of	   economic	   anthropology,	   for	   example	   as	  discussed	  by	  Gudeman	   (2001).	  Economic	  anthropologists	   study	   the	   forms	   of	   value	   creation	   and	   exchange	   that	   characterize	   different	  human	   cultures,	   including	   the	   Western.	   All	   economies	   strike	   a	   balance	   of	   market	   or	  commodity-­‐based	  production	  and	  exchange	  and	  non-­‐market	  and	  commons-­‐based	  production,	  sharing,	  and	  exchange.	  But	  Gudeman	  proposes	  a	  more	  granular	  classification	  of	  value	  domains	  which,	   importantly,	   is	  also	  dependent	  on	  scale:	  (1)	  base	  or	  commons,	  (2)	  social	  relationships,	  (3)	   accumulation	   or	   capital,	   and	   (4)	   trade	   or	  market.	   The	   first	   two	   are	   prevalent	   at	   smaller	  scales	   and	   are	   closely	   associated	   with	   community,	   whereas	   the	   latter	   two	   tend	   to	   involve	  longer-­‐distance	  interactions	  and	  are	  more	  impersonal.	  However,	  the	  domain	  of	  accumulation	  is	  equally	  important	  for	  community	  and	  for	  the	  market.	  	  The	   dependence	   of	   the	   value	   domains	   on	   scale	   is	  well	   captured	   by	   Figure	   4,	  which	   shows	   a	  schematic	   after	   Gudeman’s	   own	   graphic	   of	   how	   a	   local	   economy	   based	   on	   use-­‐value	  relationships	   can	   interface	   to	   a	   wider	   market	   economy	   that	   can	   span	   and	   connect	   multiple	  communities.	  The	  diagram	  shows	  a	  rather	  intricate	  interdependence	  between	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  economy,	  of	  which	  the	  market	  is	  emphatically	  only	  a	  part	  and	  in	  which	  the	  value	  of	  social	  relationships	   can	   be	   recognized	   to	   have	   a	   central	   role.	   In	   such	   an	   economic	   framework	   the	  market	   exchange	  of	   commodities	   coexists	   alongside	  other	   economic	  mechanisms	   such	  as	   the	  sharing	  of	   public	   goods,	   barter,	   gifting,	   and	   reciprocity.	   The	   figure	   also	   implies	   that	   different	  mechanisms	  are	  operating	  at	  different	  scales	  and	  in	  different	  institutional	  contexts.	  	  
 
	  
Figure	  4:	  Domains	  of	  economic	  value	  
Base or Commons







land, water, knowledge, laws,
practices, customs, skills, ...)
(Commitments held for their own sake)
(Resources, business relationships,
goods, money capital, public &
private institutions, banks, ...)
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Reciprocity
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To	  begin	  understanding	  this	  figure	  it	  helps	  to	  note	  that	  ‘the	  base	  in	  a	  system	  of	  social	  value	  is	  the	   counterpart	   of	   capital	   in	   a	   system	   of	   commercial	   value’	   (Gudeman,	   2001:	   33).	   Unlike	  commercial	  capital	  which	  is	  usually	  measured	  with	  a	  common	  metric,	  i.e.	  money,	  the	  values	  in	  the	  base	  are	  measured	  in	  many	  different	  ways	  that	  depend	  on	  the	  type	  of	  base	  and	  the	  type	  of	  community.	  However,	  the	  function	  of	  base	  and	  capital	  to	   ‘store’	  savings	  that,	  for	  example,	  can	  be	   accessed	   in	   hard	   times	   is	   analogous.	   The	   figure	   shows	   the	   domain	   of	   accumulation	   as	  belonging	   to	   the	   scale	   of	   community	   because	   Gudeman’s	   perspective	   emphasizes	   the	   real	  economy	   rather	   than	   the	   economy	  of	   financial	  markets.	   The	   fact	   that	   his	   object	   of	   study	  has	  predominantly	   been	   the	   village	   community	   in	   various	   ‘developing’	   countries	   probably	   also	  influences	  this	  interpretation.	  	  The	  economic	  anthropology	  analytical	  perspective	  advanced	  here,	  which	  could	  be	  said	  to	  have	  orginated	   in	   the	   work	   of	   Polanyi	   (2001[1944]),	   is	   helpful	   in	   understanding	   the	   strong	   link	  between	   open	   source	   software	   as	   a	   Commons	   and	   its	   corresponding	   open	   source	   software	  communities	  of	  developers.	  As	  Gudeman	  says,	  one	  cannot	  have	  a	  community	  without	  Commons	  or	  a	  Commons	  without	  a	  community.	  	  For	  all	  this,	  one	  should	  be	  careful	  not	  to	  get	  carried	  away	  by	  the	  ‘warm	  and	  fuzzy’	  Gemeinshaft	  connotation	   of	   community.	   Whereas	   communities	   need	   a	   shared	   set	   of	   values	   (which	   often	  serve	  as	  a	  more	  abstract	  form	  of	  Commons,	  e.g.	  various	  cultural	  forms),	  they	  can	  also	  be	  stifling	  if	  a	  single	  view	  of	  things	  is	  assumed	  or	  if	  the	  shared	  set	  of	  values	  is	  exclusive	  of	  all	  others.	  It	  is	  best	   to	   regard	   the	   shared	   values	   as	   the	   intersection	   of	   the	   values	   held	   by	   the	   community	  members,	  rather	  than	  a	  single	  set	  common	  to	  all.	  Secondly,	   too	  much	  cooperation	  can	  lead	  to	  cartels,	  which	  undermine	  market	  dynamics.	  Thus,	   there	   is	   some	  more	  work	   to	  do	  before	   the	  possibility	  of	  a	  healthy	  balance	  between	  these	  different	  positions	  can	  begin	  to	  appear	  possible.	  	  	   Institutions	  and	  Scale	  Effects	  	  The	   social	   constructivist	   lens	   being	   used	   here	   is	   compatible	   with	   the	   anthropological	  perspective	  due	  to	  the	  strong	  emphasis	  the	  latter	  places	  on	  culture	  and	  cultural	  forms.	  In	  other	  words,	   the	   economy	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   product	   of	   cultural	   expression,	   and	  money	   itself	   as	   a	  cultural	  form.	  For	  example,	  the	  symbols,	  mottos,	  and	  historical	  personages	  inscribed	  on	  coins	  and	  banknotes	  resonate	  strongly	  with	  feelings	  of	  national	  and	  collective	  identity.	  	  The	   field	   of	   institutional	   economics	   complements	   well	   economic	   anthropology	   because	   it	  espouses	   a	   view	   of	   economy	   that	   is	   explicitly	   interlinked	   with	   social	   structure,	   not	   unlike	  Granovetter’s	  economic	  sociology	  (1985).	  Institutional	  economics	  was	  founded	  by	  Veblen	  and	  one	   of	   its	   clearest	   modern	   commentators	   is	   Geoffrey	   Hodgson	   (1988):	   ‘The	   term	   “socio-­‐economic	  system”	  is	  used	  to	  emphasize	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  inseparable	  from	  a	  host	  of	  social	  and	  political	  institutions	  in	  society	  at	  large’	  (Hodgson,	  1988:	  15);	  where	  an	  ‘institution’	  is	  defined	   ‘as	   a	   social	   organization	   which,	   through	   the	   operation	   of	   tradition,	   custom	   or	   legal	  constraint,	  tends	  to	  create	  durable	  and	  routinized	  patterns	  of	  behaviour’	  (Hodgson,	  1988:	  10).	  	  In	   his	   theory	   of	   structuration,	   Giddens	   (1984),	   a	   sociologist,	   views	   institutions	   as	   structures	  that	   result	   from	   emergent	   and	   bottom-­‐up	   social	   constructivist	   processes	   but	   that,	   once	  established,	  can	  act	  as	  constraints	  on	  the	  choices	  and	  behaviour	  of	  the	  inviduals	  that	  compose	  them.	  In	  spite	  of	  such	  constraints,	  the	  existence	  within	  institutions	  of	  social	  processes	  mediated	  by	   language	   enables	   a	   process	   of	   self-­‐renewal,	   albeit	   at	   a	   much	   slower	   time-­‐scale.	   Thus,	  structuration	  offers	  a	  way	  to	  reconcile	  the	   individualistic	  vs.	  structuralist	  dichotomy	  of	  socio-­‐economic	  action	  depicted	  in	  Figure	  1.	  	  The	   range	   in	   the	   types	   and	   in	   the	   scale	   of	   institutions	   is	   enormous:	   the	   family,	   the	   Catholic	  Church,	   a	   small	   company,	   a	   multi-­‐national	   corporation,	   a	   hospital,	   a	   university,	   the	   stock	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exchange,	  etc.	  More	  to	  the	  point,	  private	  institutions	  have	  a	  legal	  personality,	  which	  means	  that	  they	   have	   the	   same	   rights	   as	   individual	   citizens.	   But	   they	   can	   be	   very	   large.	   Given	   that	   how	  institutions	   form	  and	  how	   they	  behave	  or	   can	  be	   controlled	   is	  not	   yet	   very	  well	   understood,	  one	  can	  start	  to	  see	  how	  significant	  power	  imbalances	  can	  emerge.	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  in	  Southern	  European	  countries	  the	  term	  ‘institution’	  can	  carry	  a	  significant	  negative	  connotation,	  whereas	  in	  Northern	  European	  countries	  this	  term	  is	   much	   more	   neutral,	   and	   in	   some	   cases	   it	   carries	   a	   positive	   connotation.	   I	   see	   this	   as	   a	  reflection	  of	  how	  the	  different	  levels	  of	  democratic	  maturity	  between	  different	  parts	  of	  Europe	  influences	  the	  ‘culture’	  of	  the	  institutions	  that	  emerge	  from	  the	  respective	  social	  constructivist	  processes	   and,	   therefore,	   ultimately	   also	   the	   experience	   of	   the	   individuals	   that	   interact	  with	  them.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  element	  of	  the	  discussion	  to	  follow.	  	  	  
3. MONEY,	  THE	  HISTORY	  OF	  DEBT,	  AND	  THE	  UNHOLY	  SPIRAL	  	  David	   Graeber,	   an	   anthropologist,	   recently	   published	   a	   very	   insightful,	   extremely	   well-­‐researched,	  and	  rather	  upsetting	  book	  on	  the	  history	  of	  debt	  (Graeber,	  2011).	  Trivializing	  a	  bit	  his	   main	   points	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   expediency,	   he	   shows	   how	   the	   concept	   of	   private	   property	  originated	  in	  slavery	  and	  how	  the	  roots	  of	  money	  are	   linked	  to	  violence	  and	  war.	  The	  violent	  dimension	  of	  money	   is	  better	  understood	   through	   the	  phenomenon	  of	   lifelong	  debt	  bondage,	  which	   amounts	   to	   slavery	   or	   worse,	   rather	   than	   through	   its	   association	   with	   war.	   Whereas	  Graeber’s	   work	   could	   provide	   plenty	   of	   ammunition	   for	   an	   ideological	   assault	   on	   the	  foundations	  of	   capitalism,	   I	  prefer	   to	   leave	   such	  metaphors,	   in	  word	  or	   in	  deed,	   aside	  and	   to	  focus	  on	  the	  structural	  points	  he	  made,	  which	  to	  me	  are	  far	  more	  significant	  and	  far-­‐reaching.	  	  There	   are	   two	  main	   points	   that	   I	   want	   to	   use	   here.	   First,	   Graeber	   explains	   that	  money	  was	  invented	  approximately	  4000	  years	  ago	  to	  pay	  soldiers	  that	  were	  stationed	  in	  or	  near	  a	  given	  village	  or	   town.	   So,	  how	  did	  economies	  work	  before	  money	  was	   invented?	  Apparently	   credit	  notes	  and	  individuals’	  memory	  about	  who	  owed	  what	  to	  whom	  were	  sufficient	  to	  make	  small-­‐scale	  economies	  function	  perfectly	  well.	  A	  certain	  level	  of	  mutual	  accountability	  and	  trust	  was	  required	   but	   the	   normative	   framework	   of	   a	   given	   social	   context	   can	   usually	   provide	   that	  without	   expending	   additional	   effort	   beyond	   the	   governance	   that	   organizes	   the	   village	   or	   the	  family.	  The	  problem,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  was	   that	   soldiers	  usually	   came	   from	  other	   towns	  or	  even	  other	  countries,	  so	  they	  were	  disconnected	  from	  the	  local	  social	  networks.	  Governments	  therefore	   invented	   the	   ingenious	   mechanism	   whereby	   coins	   would	   be	   minted	   to	   pay	   the	  soldiers,	  who	  would	  spend	  them	  in	  the	  local	  shops,	  such	  that	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  same	  coins	  could	  then	   be	   recouped	   by	   the	   government	   in	   the	   form	   of	   tax.	   Of	   course,	   the	   depersonalization	   of	  economic	   exchange	   that	   money	   brought	   also	   allowed	   economies	   to	   scale	   up	   in	   size	   and	  geographical	   extent	   more	   easily	   than	   the	   social	   relationships	   between	   villagers,	   so	   this	   is	   a	  positive	  effect	  that	  we	  need	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  as	  we	  develop	  the	  analysis	  further.	  	  The	  second	  point	  concerns	  money	   interest,	  which	  has	  been	  around	  as	   long	  as	  money.	   I	  could	  not	   possibly	   reproduce	   here	   the	   wonderfully	   detailed	   and	   eloquent	   400-­‐page	   discussion	   of	  interest	   and	   debt	   that	   Graeber	   offers.	   I	   will	   just	   say	   that	   the	   introduction	   of	   interest	  strengthened	   the	   ‘store	   of	   value’	   property	   of	  money	   (in	   addition	   to	   the	   ‘unit	   of	   account’	   and	  ‘medium	  of	  exchange’	  functions)	  that	  it	  had	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	  made	  of	  precious	  metals	  or	  being	  a	  token	  for	  so	  much	  gold.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  perception	  that	  money	  has	  intrinsic	  value	  entered	  in	  our	  cultures	  in	  such	  a	  pervasive	  way	  that	  it	  still	  applies	  today,	   long	  after	  the	  gold	  standard	  has	  been	  abandoned.	  Modern	  money	   carries	  value	  only	  by	   fiat	   (‘let	   it	  be	   so’)	   and	   consensual	  agreement.	  	  In	  lieu	  of	  a	  proper	  study	  of	  the	  psychology	  of	  money,	  one	  could	  venture	  to	  say	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  we	   tend	  not	   to	   be	   aware	   of	   social	   constructivist	   processes	   leads	   to	   the	   paradoxical	   situation	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where	   we	   tend	   to	   allocate	   value	   to	  money,	   as	   if	   it	   were	   gold,	   even	   though	  we	   do	   not	   quite	  understand	  what	  the	   ‘essence’	  of	  money	   is.	   In	  other	  words,	  money	  appears	  to	  become	  reified	  and	   objectified	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   remaining	   beyond	   our	   grasp	   and,	   for	   this	   reason,	  invisible	   because	   the	   concept	   of	   social	   construction	   is	   so	   strange	   and	   abstract.	   The	  depersonalization	   of	   money	   and	   the	   introduction	   of	   interest	   exacerbated	   this	   divergence	  between	  perception	  and	  understanding,	  making	  it	  easier	  for	  money	  to	  acquire	  a	  ‘mythical’	  life	  and	   fetish	   quality	   of	   its	   own	   in	   the	   collective	   imagination.	   The	   consequent	   question	   of	   the	  intrinsic	   value	   of	   gold,	   diamonds,	   and	   so	   forth	   is	   also	   extremely	   interesting	   from	  anthropological	  point	  of	  view	  (and	  rather	  puzzling	  from	  a	  physics	  point	  of	  view),	  but	  exploring	  this	  point	  would	  carry	  us	  too	  far	  from	  the	  present	  discussion.	  	  The	  paper	  has	  now	  set	  up	   two	  of	   the	   three	  elements	  of	   the	  unholy	  spiral,	   shown	   in	  Figure	  5.	  The	  third	  element	  can	  be	  variously	  called	  ‘progress’,	   ‘growth’,	   ‘utility	  maximization’,	   ‘drive	  for	  survival	  and	  territory’,	  ‘greed’,	  ‘social	  status’,	  or	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  above.	  Whether	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  human	  drive	  to	  acquire	  wealth	  and	  territory	  is	  biological	  or	  cultural/socially	  constructed,	  the	   important	  point	   is	   that	   it	   feeds	  on	  our	  perception	  of	  money	  as	   something	   that	   should	  be	  hoarded	   and	   held	   since	   its	   value	   will	   increase	   over	   time,	   and	   is	   not	   checked	   by	   social	  constraints	   given	   that	   it	   has	   been	   a	   depersonalized	   and	   disembedded	   medium	   of	   economic	  exchange	   for	   thousands	   of	   years	   in	   many	   human	   cultures	   –	   and	   especially	   in	   the	   Western	  culture.	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  This	  makes	  us	  feel	  better	  about	  the	  market	  –	  perhaps	  it	  does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  dehumanizing	  after	  all.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  capitalism	  is	  necessarily	  and	  unequivocally	  ‘bad’.	  Without	  entering	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  the	  good	  or	  bad	  aspects	  of	  capitalism,	  one	  could	  just	  say	  that	  for	  some	  kinds	  of	  economic	  transactions	  some	  level	  of	  interest	  is	  useful	  and	  fair,	  while	  for	  others	  it	   is	  not	  (e.g.	   loan	  sharks).	  It	  could	  also	  be	  said	  that	  whereas	  the	  financial	  economy	  originated	  for	  good	  reasons,	  to	  support	  the	  real	  economy,	  it	  has	  since	  in	  large	  part	  gone	  out	  of	  control	  and	  lost	  sight	  of	  any	  function	  or	  purpose	  other	  than	  to	  make	  ever-­‐more	  money	  out	  of	  money.	   Furthermore,	   the	   current	   economic	   system	   seems	   rather	   crude	   and	   unsophisticated:	  the	   same	  mechanism	   and	   the	   same	   unit	   of	   account,	  medium	  of	   exchange,	   and	   store	   of	   value	  applies	   at	   all	   scales,	   from	   the	   newsstand	   to	   financial	   markets,	   and	   it	   is	   mostly	   self-­‐serving	  rather	  than	  in	  the	  service	  of	  society.	  	  Now,	  the	  crux	  of	  the	  argument	  of	  this	  paper	  involves	  combining	  the	  unholy	  spiral	  with	  the	  scale	  effects	   of	   institutions.	   Let’s	   lump	   joint-­‐stock	   companies	   –	   normally	   referred	   as	   ‘public	  companies’	   –	  with	   companies	  whose	   equity	   is	   held	   in	   private	   hands	   as	   ‘private	   institutions’.	  Such	   institutions	  have	  a	  mandate	  to	  maximize	  profit	   for	  their	  shareholders.	  Because	  they	  can	  be	  very	  large	  and	  have	  the	  same	  rights	  as	  individuals,	  they	  become	  effectively	  ‘lumbering	  giants’	  that	  roam	  freely	  among	  us.	  It	  then	  becomes	  apparent	  how	  even	  their	  perfectly	  legal	  actions	  can	  wreak	   havoc	   among	   smaller	   players	   –	   which	   often	   include	   governments,	   not	   just	   small	  companies	  or	  individual	  citizens	  –	  and/or	  the	  environment.	  This	  is	  then	  what	  I	  was	  referring	  to	  as	   the	   ‘structural’	   aspects	   of	   the	   current	   political	   economy	   landscape:	   the	   formation	   of	  institutional	  structures,	  through	  social	  constructivist	  processes,	  whose	  logic	  is	  influenced	  by	  an	  uncritical	  and	  haphazard	  evolution	  of	  money	  as	  a	  cultural	   form	  that	  has	   fed	  and	  continues	  to	  feed	   the	   most	   basic	   human	   instincts	   in	   a	   way	   that	   is	   destructive	   for	   the	   individual	   and	   for	  society.	   It	   is	   our	   poor	   understanding	   of	   the	   interaction	   between	   the	   biological	   and	   cultural	  dimensions	  of	   human	  actions	   and	  motivations	   combined	  with	   the	   emergence	  of	   these	   ‘dumb	  and	  hungry	  giants’	  that	  spells	  disaster.	  	  The	  political	  and	   ideological	  battleground	  has	   largely	  been	  around	  the	  moral	  philosophy	  that	  condemns	   or	   celebrates	   different	   aspects	   of	   human	   nature.	   I	   contend	   that	   a	   better	  understanding	  of	  social	  systems	  through	  social	  science	  has	  now	  given	  us	   the	  tools	   to	   identify	  one	   of	   the	   important	   roots	   of	   the	   problem	  –	   if	   not	   the	  only	   root	   –	   and	   that	  we	   are	   now	   in	   a	  position	  to	  change	   it.	  Therefore,	   I	  advocate	  a	   type	  of	  action	  that	  prioritizes	  a	  gradual	  cultural	  transformation	  process	  over	  political	  struggle,	  which	  in	  any	  case	  I	  see	  as	  a	  losing	  battle	  given	  the	  forces	  at	  play.	  In	  particular,	  since	  money	  appears	  to	  play	  a	  role	  in	  socio-­‐economic	  processes	  that	   is	   analogous	   to	   the	   role	   of	   language	   in	   social	   constructivist	   processes,	   changes	   to	   the	  properties	   of	   money	   will	   percolate	   to	   and	   permeate	   every	   aspect	   of	   the	   economic	   culture.	  Therefore,	   it	  may	   be	   possible	   to	   find	   a	   currency	   design	   that	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   ‘starve’	   the	  giants.	  The	  next	  section	  outlines	  the	  properties	  of	  one	  such	  system.	  	  	  
4. COMMUNITY	  CURRENCIES	  AND	  A	  POSSIBLE	  STRATEGY	  FOR	  LOCAL	  ACTION	  	  Having	  acquired	  the	  rich	  anthropological	  perspective	  of	  Gudeman	  and	  Graeber,	  it	  is	  now	  easier	  to	  see	  and	  appreciate	  the	  struggles	  of	  indigenous	  and	  traditional	  peoples	  around	  the	  world	  as	  they	   try	   to	  resist	   the	  corrupting	   influence	  of	   the	  Western	  capitalist	  economy	  or	  simply	   try	   to	  survive	   in	   the	   face	   of	   displacement	   and	   annihilation	   of	   their	   economic	   spheres	   or	   the	  environment	   by	   large	   multinational	   corporation	   with	   huge	   market	   power.	   For	   example,	   as	  explained	   by	   one	   of	   the	   Roundtable	   participants	   (Nigel	   Haggan),	   the	   First	   Nations	   tribes	   of	  British	  Columbia,	  represented	  at	  the	  Roundtable	  by	  Chief	  Beau	  Dick,	  see	  the	  spirits	  inhabiting	  natural	   forms	  as	   their	   relatives.	  Therefore,	   they	  do	  not	   ‘protect’	   them	  because	   that	  would	  be	  condescending,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  exploit	  them	  to	  extinction	  either!	  The	  objectification	  of	  nature	  characteristic	   of	  Western	   culture	  makes	   it	   possible	   to	   exploit	   and	   destroy	   the	   environment.	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This	  contrast	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  difference	  between	  socially-­‐embedded	  local	  credit	  systems	  and	  the	  depersonalization	  of	  economic	  exchange	  brought	  by	  money	  as	  we	  know	  it.	  	  Unfortunately,	   the	  rising	   importance	  of	   individualism	  and	  individuality	  that	  modernity	  brings	  makes	  it	  increasingly	  difficult	  for	  traditional	  cultures	  to	  hold	  on	  to	  the	  values	  they	  know	  to	  be	  important	   for	   cultural	   and	   individual	   survival.	   Even	   if	   we	   rule	   out	   the	   individualism	   of	  neoclassical	   economics,	   individualism	   in	   terms	   of	   personal	   freedoms	   and	   personal	   rights	   is	  important	  as	  a	  foundation	  for	  democracy,	  which	  to	  most	  of	  the	  world’s	  peoples	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  ideal	  worth	  striving	  for.	  In	  fact,	  individualism	  is	  also	  the	  basis	  of	  social	  constructivist	  processes,	  and	  as	  such	  it	  is,	  as	  this	  paper	  has	  argued,	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  democratic	  processes	  and	  institutions.	  	  How	  can	  this	  often	  tragic	  situation,	  thus,	  be	  approached	  in	  a	  constructive	  way?	  It	  seems	  wise	  to	  look	   for	   a	   solution	   that	   is	   compatible	   with	   the	   prevailing	   economic	   system,	   so	   as	   not	   to	   be	  perceived	  as	  ‘deviant’,	  revolutionary,	  or	  worse.	  The	  foregoing	  analysis	  and	  discussion	  suggests	  that,	   therefore,	   a	  different	  kind	  of	   currency	  should	  satisfy	   the	   following	  requirements	   for	   the	  economic	  system	  it	  mediates:	  	   •	  compatible	  with	  the	  wider	  (capitalist)	  market	  economy	  and	  dynamics	  •	  compatible	  with	  and	  accountable	  to	  fiscal	  policy	  •	  supportive	  of	  local/small	  economic	  players	  •	  socially	  embedded	  •	  free	  from	  the	  corrosive	  effect	  of	  interest-­‐based	  money	  capitalism	  •	  resistant	  to	  the	  market	  power	  of	  the	  larger	  players	  	  There	  have	  been	  many	  experiments	  with	  different	  kinds	  of	  community	  currencies,	  for	  example	  the	  LETS	  system	  invented	  by	  Michael	  Linton	  on	  Vancouver	  Island	  in	  1981	  (Croall,	  1997);	  or	  the	  WIR	  system	  established	  in	  1936	  in	  Switzerland	  and	  currently	  counting	  60,000	  small	  companies	  as	  members	  (Dini,	  2012);	  or	  the	  credit	  notes	  systems	  that	  emerged	  in	  2001	  in	  Argentina	  when	  their	  banks	  collapsed;	  or	  the	  thousands	  of	  other	  experiments	  around	  the	  world	  that	  have	  been	  around	  for	  thousands	  of	  years.	  These	  experiments	  tend	  to	  emerge	  in	  times	  of	  economic	  crisis,	  when	   the	  prevailing	  money-­‐based	  systems	  run	  aground;	   in	  such	  situations	  people	  rediscover	  their	  ability	  to	  create	  wealth	  and	  to	  build	  an	  economy	  from	  nothing,	  starting	  from	  mutual	  trust	  and	  labour.	  	  Some	   of	   these	   different	   types	   of	   community	   currencies	   are	   discussed	   in	   my	   working	   paper	  (Dini,	  2012)	  and	  in	  the	  references	  therein.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  discussion	  I	  see	  community	  currency	  systems	  as	  important	  in	  three	  ways:	  	   1-­‐	   they	   can	   be	   regarded	   as	   ‘laboratories	   of	   institutional	   learning’.	   This	   increases	   the	   democratic	  awareness	  and	  maturity	  of	   the	   communities	   that	   adopt	   them	  because	   the	  management	  of	   such	  currency	   systems	   and	   the	   participation	   by	   the	   community	   members	   in	   a	   governance	   process	  based	  on	  transparency,	  accountability	  and	  trust	  are	  one	  and	  the	  same	  thing.	  2-­‐	  community	  currencies	  help	  us	  understand	  how	  to	   ‘colonize’	  economic	  value	  with	  social	  value,	   in	  direct	   contrast	   with	   the	   commodification	   of	   social	   value	   that	   we	   see,	   for	   example,	   with	   the	  marketing	  of	  Google	  or	  Facebook	  analytics	  in	  social	  networks.	  3-­‐	   If	  money	   as	   a	  medium	  of	   economic	   exchange	  plays	   the	   same	   function	   in	   economic	  processes	   as	  language	   plays	   in	   social	   processes,	   then	   community	   currencies	   can	   catalyze	   the	   social	  construction	  of	  economic	  identity	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  economic	  empowerment	  and	  independence	  that	  is	  vital	  for	  giving	  back	  hope	  to	  marginalized	  and	  disenfranchized	  communities.	  	  A	  community	  currency	  experiment	  that	  started	  after	  the	  most	  recent	  banking	  crisis	  and	  that	  is	  going	  strong	   is	  Sardex.net,	  based	   in	  Sardinia	  (http://sardex.net).	  Sardex	  can	  also	  be	  regarded	  as	   a	  multilateral	   barter	   system	   and	   is	  modelled	   after	   the	   Swiss	  WIR,	   but	   has	   adopted	   some	  elements	   of	   the	   LETS	   system.	   After	   4	   years,	   the	   Sardex	   circuit	   has	   2000	  member	   companies	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throughout	  Sardinia,	  it	  has	  achieved	  national	  and	  international	  recognition,	  and	  it	  is	  now	  being	  replicated	  in	  six	  other	  Italian	  regions.	  	  The	  central	  concept	  of	  the	  Sardex	  or	  the	  LETS	  system	  is	  best	  explained	  by	  a	  figure,	  see	  Figure	  6.	  The	  sum-­‐total	  of	  all	  accounts	  is	  always	  zero	  by	  definition.	  Each	  transaction	  is	  essentially	  a	  zero-­‐interest	  loan	  that	  is	  mediated	  by	  the	  central	  credit-­‐clearing	  service.	  Sardex	  is	  currently	  at	  zero	  interest	  and	  only	  relatively	  small	  B2B	  transactions	  are	  allowed.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  whether	  they	  will	  move	  to	  larger	  loans	  such	  as	  mortgages	  and,	  like	  the	  WIR,	  in	  that	  case	  start	  charging	  interest.	  If	  that	  were	  to	  happen	  they	  would	  acquire	  an	  institutional	  structure	  that	  is	  closer	  to	  a	  cooperative	  bank	  (EU),	  building	  society	  (UK),	  or	  credit	  union	  (Canada,	  US),	  similarly	  to	  the	  WIR	  Bank.	  Each	  transaction	   is	   mediated	   by	   the	   central	   server,	   thus	   everything	   is	   invoiced.	   This	   means	   that	  there	   is	   total	   fiscal	   transparency.	   Each	  member	   signs	   a	   contract	   upon	   joining	   in	  which	   they	  commit	  to	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  economic	  activity,	  with	  upper	  and	  lower	  caps	  on	  credit	  and	  debt,	  respectively.	   Membership	   for	   individual	   citizens	   is	   being	   considered,	   where	   such	   members	  would	  not	  be	  allowed	  to	  go	  negative	  (acquire	  a	  debt)	  but	  could	  spend	  Sardex	  credits	  in	  shops	  that	   accept	   them	   if	   they	   have	   a	   positive	   balance.	   They	   could	   acquire	   credits	   as	   part	   of	   their	  salaries	  from	  local	  employers.	  All	  transactions	  are	  currently	  being	  conducted	  with	  a	  phone	  app.	  	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  6:	  Distribution	  of	  Sardex	  credits	  showing	  members	  in	  debt	  and	  in	  credit.	  Total	  sum	  is	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There	  are	  many	  other	  technical	  details	  about	  the	  Sardex	  that	  should	  be	  thoroughly	  understood	  before	  attempting	   to	   replicate	   it.	   It	   is	   interesting	   to	  note,	  however,	   that	  none	  of	   the	   founding	  members	  of	   Sardex	   is	   an	  economist	  or	   a	   software	  engineer.	  They	  are	  all	  humanists,	  which	   is	  actually	   quite	   telling.	   In	   this	   brief	   summary	   the	   idea	  was	   to	   give	   a	   flavour	   for	   the	   very	   real	  possibility	   to	   create	   an	   alternative	   economy	   that	   is	   compatible	  with	   the	   prevailing	   capitalist	  market	  economy,	  that	  can	  live	  side-­‐by-­‐side	  with	  it,	  and	  that	  relies	  on	  local	  solidarity	  and	  non-­‐capitalist	  market	  exchange.	  I	  close	  with	  a	  visualization	  of	  the	  WIR	  bank	  using	  the	  colour	  code	  of	  Gudeman’s	  domains	  of	  value,	  in	  Figure	  7.	  	  	  
	  	  
Figure	  7:	  Visualization	  of	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  economic	  identity	  	  	  	  
5. CONCLUSION	  	  In	  conclusion,	  I	  hope	  this	  paper	  has	  provided	  enough	  evidence	  for	  a	  diagnosis	  of	  what	  appears	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  most	  difficult	  and	  fundamental	  problems	  of	  modern	  society:	  the	  cultural	  roots	  of	   money	   as	   a	   flawed	  medium	   of	   economic	   exchange.	   Money	   should	   not	   be	   eliminated,	   and	  neither	  should	  interest,	  completely	  or	  unilaterally;	  and	  capitalism	  is	  not	  necessarily	  destructive.	  We	   do	   however	   need	   to	   start	   a	   more	   serious	   and	  more	   sophisticated	   study	   of	   some	   of	   the	  monsters	   we	   have	   created,	   in	   order	   to	   bring	   them	   back	   to	   their	   original	   functions	   to	   serve	  society	   rather	   than	   destroying	   it	   and	   its	   environment.	   If	  many	   local	   examples	   of	   community	  currency	   such	   as	   the	   one	   outlined	   here	  were	   to	   spring	   up	   around	   the	  world,	   for	   example	   in	  connection	  with	  local	  fishery	  or	  analogous	  ‘business	  ecosystems’,	  within	  a	  couple	  of	  decades	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  what	  money	  is	  may	  infiltrate	  the	  public’s	  perception	  –	  along	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  can	  indeed	  take	  control	  of	  this	  all-­‐important	  element	  in	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  our	  reality,	  economic	  well-­‐being	  and,	  ultimately,	  environment.	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